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Does Inflation Targeting Matter?  A Reassessment  




This paper uses a number of identification approaches (using instrumental variables, 
assumptions about heteroscedasticity and panel fixed effects) to estimate the effect of 
inflation targeting on inflation.  Generally, it finds the effect is small and insignificant. 
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Introduction 
 
A number of countries have adopted inflation targeting and a substantial literature exists 
on the virtues of inflation targeting in reducing inflation (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1999).  
However, the reported results conflict.  This paper will attempt to reconcile the 
discrepancies and shed more light on the effect of inflation targeting on inflation using a 
number of identification approaches. 
  
The seminal paper in the previous literature is Ball and Sheridan (2003).   They compare 
the inflation performance of inflation targeters to those of non-targeters and find that 
while inflation targeters reduced their inflation rates after inflation targeting, this effect 
goes away once one controls for past poor performance.  They suggest that this is due to 
regression to the mean.  However subsequent work, grappling with the potential problems 
of cross-sectional analysis, has cast doubt on their results.  Wu (2004a), using fixed time 
and country effects, finds that OECD countries that were inflation targeters had lower 
inflation rates even controlling for past inflation.  In a revised version of Wu’s paper 
(2004b), he recognizes the problems of using differences in differences estimators.  He 
argues that a valid approach to deal with this problem is to use Arellano-Bond panel 
estimation (1991) as long as the errors are not serially correlated.  He finds no evidence 
of serial correlation and hence argues that his estimates, which suggest inflation targeting 
significantly reduces inflation, are reliable.
1    
                                                 
1 Others have also examined this issue.  For example Levin et al (2004), IMF (2005), Petursson (2004) and 
Truman (2003) look at the effect of inflation targeting on samples that include developing countries.  Vega 
and Winkelried (2005) present results for both developing and developed countries using matching 
methods which suggests that inflation targeting has a significant effect on inflation.  Differences between   3
 
Hyvonen (2004) confirms Ball and Sheridan’s result that lagged inflation is important for 
explaining recent inflation performance of OECD countries.  However Hyvonen finds 
that lagged inflation does not help predict inflation in the 1970s.  Hyvonen also finds 
reversion to the mean in inflation when developing countries are included in the sample 
for the 1990s.  Hyvonen interprets these results as being consistent with a global policy of 
inflation targeting in the 1990s whether or not countries formally adopted inflation 
targets.  This suggests that perhaps any regime which is focused on keeping inflation low 
may be effective in achieving this goal.   
 
This present paper seeks to reassess whether inflation targeting reduces inflation.   Given 
the conflicting evidence, we seek to understand better the results of Wu and Ball and 
Sheridan.  In addition to reconciling these two sets of results, we use instrumental 
variables and other identification approaches to provide more evidence about the likely 
effect of inflation targeting on inflation.  We do not claim to be able to identify the effect 
of any global effort to reduce inflation in the 1990s.  To preview the results, we find that 
there is little evidence that inflation targeting has an economically or statistically 
significant effect on inflation using a number of estimation approaches.  This conclusion 
is compelling as (a) we use a dataset which had previously been used to argue that 
inflation targeting was significant and (b) we confirm a number of existing results in the 
literature. 
                                                                                                                                                 
their results and those presented here are likely due to the different identification approaches employed.  
For example, our preferred panel results rely on more lags (a larger information set).  Also the nature of the 
identification assumptions are different (see for example Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) for relevant 




One issue is how to reconcile Wu’s and Ball and Sheridan’s results.  Wu’s (2004a) results 
use panel data with country and time fixed effects with a dummy variable, indicating 
whether the country is currently an inflation targeter.  Ball and Sheridan run cross-
country regressions examining what factors affected how inflation changed from roughly 
1960-85 to the 1990s (when inflation targeting was practiced).  The regressions Ball and 
Sheridan ran are essentially of the form: 
i i i i T ε ψπ β α π + + + = Δ * 
where change in pi is the difference in inflation between the current and past  (when no 
countries practiced inflation targeting) periods, pi* is the pre-inflation target inflation rate 
and T is the indicator for being an inflation targeter.  i is the country index.  Wu’s 
regressions are variants of 
it it it t i it T ε ψπ β δ α π + + + + = Δ −1                                                                        (1) 
where i is the country index and t indicates the time period where he uses quarterly data. 
 
Prima facie, the panel estimates use more observations than the cross-sectional estimates, 
so we are more likely to get more precise estimates from the panel.  However, Bertrand, 
Duflo and Mullianathan (2002) discuss how the panel approach, when there is serial 
dependence in both the dependent variable and in the treatment variable (i.e. the indicator 
that the country is an inflation targeter), will lead to misleading standard errors.  As there 
is persistence through time in both inflation and the inflation targeting dummy, this seems   5
like a potential concern here.  So we use a number of approaches that are immune to this 
problem to assess which result appears more reliable. 
 
Using Wu’s data, we run a specification similar to that of Ball and Sheridan which 
compares average inflation before and after the inflation targeting period.  Though the 
ordinary least squares standard errors are correct, the estimates may be less precise as we 
are reducing the number of data points by aggregating data.   
 
We rerun the regressions similar to Wu (2004b) using the Arellano-Bond estimation 
technique.  Finally, we rerun the regressions of Wu (2004a) except we calculate the 
standard errors using the “placebo” approach discussed in Bertrand et al.  Specifically 
this involves running many regressions replacing the actual treatment variable with a 
generated variable where we randomly choose when countries became inflation targeters.  
(In effect we are making some assumptions about the statistical properties of the inflation 
targeting variable such as once a country becomes an inflation targeter it continues to be 
one.)  As we randomly choose the timing of this transition rather than use the actual data, 
this variable should be insignificant.   So, by replicating these regressions many times, we 
get a distribution of coefficient values under the null that inflation targeting is 
insignificant.  Using this distribution, we can determine whether the observed coefficient 
value is statistically insignificant.  In essence, we are going to show that we can replicate 
Ball and Sheridan’s results using Wu’s data.  We are also going to show that when using 
the placebo laws or the Arellano Bond estimation technique, the inflation targeting   6
variable is insignificant.  These two results suggest that Ball and Sheridan’s results and 
conclusions are supported by Wu’s data. 
 
Another issue is that Ball and Sheridan’s ordinary least squares results do not necessarily 
imply that inflation targeting was irrelevant for the lowering of inflation in inflation 
targeting countries, because of potential endogeneity (as Gertler, 2003, discusses).   For 
example countries with histories of high inflation or expecting future high inflation are 
more likely to have felt compelled to adopt inflation targets.  There are a number of ways 
to account for endogeneity.  The first and more obvious approach is to use an instrument 
for being an inflation targeter.  We will use as instruments (a) being an English speaking 
country and (b) the interaction between this and having high inflation.  This identification 
approach assumes that sharing a common language means that the central bank and 
government were more likely to be influenced by the same theories about how to 
effectively fight inflation.  We will also use as an instrument Cukierman et al’s (1992) 
measure of central bank independence in 1980-89 as central banks that had less historical 
independence may have greater need to become inflation targeters to indicate that they 
would be vigilant in fighting inflation.  Consistent with this, Boschen and Weise (2004) 
provides some evidence that independence effects inflation performance.  As a third 
instrument, we will use information about benefit entitlements during the 1980s.  Di Tella 
and MacCulloch (2001) argue and provide some empirical evidence that higher 
unemployment benefits may mean the central bank is less concerned about the costs of 
unemployment and hence focuses more on reducing inflation.  By this reasoning, 
economies which have had histories of low unemployment benefits and/or high inflation   7
are more likely to be perceived to lack a credible commitment to low inflation and hence 
are more likely to adopt inflation targeting to try to gain credibility.   
 
One potential concern is the validity of these instruments.  It is not clear how language 
should directly affect the inflation process.  Also the effect of past central bank 
institutions and credibility on current inflation seems most likely to be through current 
institutions (like whether the central bank is an inflation targeter).  Hence it seems 
reasonable to believe that the language and Cukierman credibility measure are valid 
instruments.  A more plausible concern is that unemployment benefits in the 1980s may 
not be a valid instrument.  Specifically, 1980s unemployment benefits may affect central 
bank behavior in the 1990s, through mechanisms other than their role in whether the 
central bank became an inflation targeter.  For example, as unemployment benefits are 
relatively persistent, 1980s benefits could also influence central bank behavior through 
their correlation with benefits in the 1990s. 
 
We also employ another identification approach which does not rely on an instrument.  It 
assumes that the structural model can be represented as follows: 
i i i








ε ψπ β α π
         ( 2 )  
So the first equation describes inflation determination and the second equation is a 
selection equation for being an inflation targeter. With these assumptions, we can 
estimate the following two equations by least squares consistently
2: 
                                                 
2 We can consistently estimate the second equation if E(u|1,π*)=0 which is satisfied if    8
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Based on the assumptions made so far, we cannot identify the parameter of interest, beta.   
However, we can identify beta by making any one of a number of assumptions.  One is to 
assume that the structural error on the first equation in the system described by (2) varies 
depending on whether the country was a high or low inflation country in the past.
3  This 
is consistent with the idea, argued elsewhere, that inflation uncertainty increases with the 
level of inflation.
4  A natural way of capturing this is to assume that countries that had 
higher than average inflation in the past have a structural error for inflation which is A>1 
times the size of the structural error of low inflation countries (so the variance is A 
squared times bigger and the covariance with the other structural error is A times bigger).  
This will result in the covariance of the reduced form errors differing between the high 
and the low inflation countries.  An alternative view might be that central banks with 
histories of past high inflation may be more vigilant at mitigating the effect of inflation 
                                                                                                                                                 
0=P(T=1| π*)(1-δ-ρπ*)+P(T=0| π*) (-δ -ρπ*).  A necessary condition for this to be true is that  (1-δ-ρπ*) 
and (-δ -ρπ*) are of opposite signs which given our estimates of the parameters (see below) is true for every 
observation of our data. 
3 This is an application of Rigobon’s (2003) approach of using heteroscedasticity to identify the parameter 
of interest. 
4 Andersen and Gruen (1995) observe that average inflation is correlated with inflation variability.     9
shocks in the future and hence that A may be less than one.  Either way, as long as A 





To reconcile the Wu and Ball and Sheridan results, first we used Wu’s data to estimate 
models very similar to Ball and Sheridan’s.  Specifically we estimate cross-sectional 
models where inflation is average quarterly inflation from 1995 and past inflation is 
average quarterly inflation from 1985 to 1989.
6  This essentially captures the periods 
before treatment (no country was an inflation targeter before 1990) and after treatment.
7  
We include past inflation as a control as this could effect both current inflation and the 
decision to become a targeter.  As a simple check for whether the results appear sensitive 
to potential endogeneity bias, we perform instrumental variables regressions.
8  As another 
check for robustness, we also examine whether the results were sensitive to stopping the 
                                                 
5 The assumption that parameters like beta and psi are the same for the high and low inflation countries 
could be concerning.  However as this assumption is standard in the literature, it seems like a natural 
assumption to make in any attempt to reconcile apparently conflicting results in that literature.   
6 For more details about the data, refer to the Appendix. 
7 Except for the following cases, all inflation targeters in the sample were consistently targeting after 1995.  
Switzerland became an inflation targeter in 2000 and for the purposes of the cross-sectional analysis is 
considered a non-targeter.  Spain and Finland were targeters until 1999 when they adopted the EMU.  They 
are treated as inflation targeters for the cross-sectional analysis. 
8 We include both the English speaking and the Cukierman variables as variables in column (4) of Table 1 
as the Cukierman variable is a weak instrument when used by itself.  In column (5) of Table 1 use the 
summary measure of benefit entitlements over 1979-1985 given in Table 8.2 of OECD (1994).  It is 
basically the benefits entitlement before tax as a percentage of previous earnings before tax averaged over 
various earning levels and years of the unemployment benefit (see OECD (1994) for more details).  We 
have some confidence in our instrumental estimates as while it is difficult to get precisely estimated 
coefficients in the first stage because of so many interactions, reassuringly at least some of the coefficients 
are consistent with our priors.  For example, English speaking countries with high past inflation are more 
likely to be targeters and countries with histories of high unemployment benefits are less likely to be 
targeters.   10
sample at 1999 when arguably the institutional arrangements of many countries become 
less clear because of the beginning of the European Monetary Union.   
 
Both the IV and OLS results (Table 1) suggest that targeting in almost all specifications 
has an insignificant effect on inflation.  Moreover the coefficient on the targeting variable 
is of roughly the same order of magnitude as Ball and Sheridan’s estimates and is about 
one-third the size of Wu’s.
9  We know that these cross-sectional results do have reliable 
standard errors so prima facia these results confirm Ball and Sheridan’s findings that 
inflation targeting has a small and insignificant effect and at best Wu’s results are 
different because of the increased number of observations available from using quarterly 
data.  To the extent that the goal of inflation targeting is primarily about reducing the 
medium term inflation rate then Ball and Sheridan’s finding disturbingly suggests that the 
effect is small (even if Wu’s estimation procedure is robust).  Given the similarity of the  
the IV and OLS results we can also conclude that while there may be some endogeneity 
bias, it is not large. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
Using the cross-sectional data we can also identify the treatment coefficient by examining 
the estimated covariance matrix of the reduced form equations (see the discussion above).  
Using inflation after 1995 as the measure of inflation during the treatment period, we find 
beta is roughly 0.03 which is positive but very small and insignificant (see Table 2).  This 
                                                 
9 The only regression to result in a significant and somewhat more substantial estimate for the targeting 
coefficient is in the 11th column of Table 1.  We are skeptical about the weight to put on this result because 
the result is not robust.    11
seems consistent with the result of our findings – that the coefficient is close to zero and 
insignificant.  Moreover some of the other parameter point estimates are consistent with 
what we expect.  Higher inflation is associated with greater inflation in the future and 
higher past inflation is associated with being a targeter.  The scale factor, A, is different 
from one though it is imprecisely estimated. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
As already discussed, Wu’s original paper (2004a) used difference in difference 
estimation to estimate the effect of targeting which can lead to misleading standard 
errors.  In a revised version of Wu’s paper (2004b), he recognizes the problems of using 
differences in differences estimators and uses Arellano-Bond panel estimation.  His 
specifications include a time trend and one lag.  He tests and finds no serial correlation at 
the 5 percent significance level arguing that this suggests his estimates are reliable.  
While we find a treatment effect of similar magnitude when using one lag for inflation 
(see Table 3), we find that higher order lags are significant.  Our preferred specification 
has 12 lags of inflation (for the model without time fixed effects the 12
th lag is significant 
and the 4 and 8 lag models show signs of serial correlation).  This suggests his results are 
likely to be affected by omitted variable bias.  For our preferred model, the effect of the 
target variable is much smaller and insignificant. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here.] 
   12
Two potential concerns with the above results are that (a) the instruments used in the 
Arellano-Bond estimation may be weak and (b) the inclusion of 12 lags may be 
excessive, leading to inefficient estimates.  Simple regressions of the first difference of 
inflation on its lag are highly significant (with t statistics of around 16 whether or not 
time fixed effects are included) suggesting that the instruments are not weak.  Also we 
find that the target variable is insignificant and of a similar order of magnitude once we 
include four lags, suggesting that our results are not being driven by overspecification of 
the model.  
 
We also present some estimates of the treatment parameter, using Wu’s quarterly data 
and one of the procedures suggested in Bertrand et al. (2002)  – the placebo approach 
(which is based on the randomization inference tests used in statistics).  One issue with 
their placebo approach is that it is not clear exactly what the data generating process of 
becoming an inflation targeter is.  We consider three arguably plausible processes.  The 
first placebo, perhaps the least plausible, is based on the assumption that all countries 
became inflation targeters but they did so randomly within the sample.  This is 
problematic as not all countries became targeters and no country began targeting early in 
the sample.  The second placebo still assumes that the timing of becoming a targeter is 
random in the sample but only allows the countries we observe to be inflation targeters to 
make that transition.  This perhaps is also problematic as it allows positive probability 
that they became targeters in the 1980s.  The third placebo captures this concern by 
allowing the random transition to inflation targeting to only have occurred amongst 
countries we have seen became inflation targeters and only to occur during the 1990s.   13
 
Table 4 presents our results.  Each column represents the results of a different 
specification (with varying fixed effects and lags of inflation).  The first row reports the 
point estimate and robust standard errors, which we have argued could be misleading.  
The next three rows report whether based on our three placebo distributions (which are 
generated under the null that there is no effect) the point coefficient is significant at the 5 
per cent level.  The results show that the point estimates are large – some even larger than 
Wu’s estimates - and significance is sensitive to the data generating process assumed.  
However for all three placebos if country and time fixed effects are included with 12 lags, 
the targeting variable is insignificant.  Also the results for the more plausible placebos 
lead us to conclude these coefficients are insignificant across all specifications.   
 
While the results from the first placebo could be interpreted as providing some evidence 
that inflation targeting matters, we have a more cautious view.  The difference between 
placebos one and two are the set of countries that are allowed to become inflation 
targeters.  Hence the significant results are likely to be spurious if countries self-select 
into inflation targetering.  We have already argued that this is the case and the 
instrumental variable results which seek to correct for this bias indicate that the effect of 
inflation targeting is insignificant and reasonably small. 
 
While the different identification approaches employed suggest somewhat different 
estimates of the impact of inflation targeting on inflation, they are generally insignificant 
and suggest that inflation targeting reduces quarterly inflation by around 0.1 percentage   14
points.  This suggests that it reduces four-quarter ended inflation by on average about 0.4 
percentage points which by a number of possible metrics is small.  First, inflation 
targeters typically have a band of one percentage point or more (e.g. Australia and New 
Zealand).  Also, central banks have a fairly imprecise control over inflation.  Finally, 0.4 
percentage points is small compared to the large drops in inflation seen in many of these 
countries over the sample period (e.g. inflation in New Zealand fell from around 9 per 
cent in 1989 to around 2 percent in 1992).  Even based on the types of estimates that Wu 
obtained, this only explains a small fraction of the observed decrease in inflation.  
  





We find that, whatever estimation approach is adopted, the estimated effect of inflation 
targeting on inflation is generally small and insignificant.  Long-run inflation is the 
ultimate target of inflation targeting central banks and so the cross-section approach of 
Ball and Sheridan is most relevant.  Using this approach, we find similar results whether 
or not we account for potential endogeneity.  While we are able to confirm Wu’s results, 
there are reasons to question their reliability (as he excludes statistically significant lags 
of inflation).  Using more lags of inflation lead to a much smaller estimated effect and, 
even using his lag specification, alternative ways of calculating the standard errors 
suggest the coefficient is insignificant.  Other identification approaches also generally 
confirm these conclusions.
10 
                                                 
10 Some of the other existing literature (e.g. Levin et al (2004) and Truman (2003)) also argues that 
inflation targeting reduced inflation in developed countries.  Truman’s results however seem likely to be   15
 
So, at best there is only weak evidence that inflation targeting contributed to the 
reduction in inflation experienced in developed countries in the 1990s.  Nevertheless 
inflation targeting may have had some benefits.  To the extent that the existence of 
inflation targeting caused an increase in the focus on the costs of inflation during the 
1990s and the need to reduce these costs, inflation targeting may have played a role in the 











                                                                                                                                                 
due to the exclusion of lagged inflation from their specification which our analysis suggests is significant. 
Levin et al argue that inflation is less persistent and inflation expectations are lower in inflation targeting 
countries.  While these are interesting and important results, it is not necessarily clear that they demonstrate 
that inflation targeting has reduced inflation.  Papers including developing economies (e.g. IMF, 2005, and 
Petursson, 2004) provide more convincing evidence that inflation targeting matters (though they do not use 
IV techniques to control for potential endogeneity).  This suggests that inflation targeting may be a useful 
monetary policy strategy for some countries.   16
Data Appendix 
 
We use Wu’s data which is from Q1 1985 to Q3 2002 for the traditional OECD country 
members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.  They are 
quarterly inflation rates and the following are considered inflation targeters: Australia 
(from September 1994), Canada (from February 1991), Finland (from Febuary 1993 to 
December 1998), New Zealand (from March 1990), Spain (from September 1994 to 
December 1998), Sweden (from January 1993), Switzerland (from January 2000) and the 
United Kingdom (from October 1992).  For some countries (like Australia) the dating of 
inflation targeting is not straight forward.  (Bernanke et al, 1999, notes the informality 
with which the Australian inflation target was announced.)  Here we adopted the dating 
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Cukerierman       0.32 
(0.44)# 
       
Cukierman× 
Past Inflation 
    -1.10 
(0.81)# 
       
Cukierman× 
English speaking 
    -7.29* 
(3.21)# 




    5.10* 
(2.20)# 
       
Benefits         -0.02 
(0.01)# 
      
Benefits× 
Past Inflation 
     0.03* 
(0.01)# 
      






      






      
Instrument from 
Model 
          (3) (3) (4) (4) (5) (5) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis and p values in brackets.  * Significant at the 5 percent level.   
The dependent variable is (a) whether or not the central bank became a targeter, (b) change in inflation from pre-1990 to post-1994 or (c) change in inflation 
from pre-1990 to 1995-1998.   21
Table 2: Model Estimates Based on Heteroscedasticity Assumption 
β  σε
2  σu










































Point estimates and t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Estimated by efficient GMM. * This is a t 
statistic for A being less than one. 
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Inflation lags  1  1  1  12  12  12 
Country effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Time trend  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No 
Autocorrelation 
Test p value 
0.15 0.15 0.12  0.16 0.16 0.11 
Arellano-Bond estimation assuming the targeting variable is exogenous.   The Sargan p value for all 
regressions is 1.  The autocorrelation test is a test of whether the average autocovariance of residuals of 
order 2 is zero. Robust standard errors in parenthesis and p values in brackets. * Significant at the 5 percent 
level.   23
 
 















Yes Yes  No Yes  Yes  No 
Significant 
Placebo 2 
No No No No  No  No 
Significant 
Placebo 3 
No No No No  No  No 
Inflation 
lags 
None 1  12  None  1 12 
Country 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
All regressions are regressions of quarterly inflation with country and time fixed effects.  Significance 
statements are based on the two tailed test at the 5 per cent level. 
Placebo 1 assumes random transition of all countries to inflation targeting some time in the sample.  
Placebo 2 assumes random transition of inflation targeting countries some time in the sample. 
Placebo 3 assumes transition of the inflation targeting countries in the 1990s. 
 